by Derek Parfit 31 December 2007 In my book Reasons and Persons, I defended one view about the metaphysics of persons, and also claimed that personal identity is not what matters. 54-65. Everyone chooses to live these long lives. DEREK PARFIT Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Principles I. I'm not entirely prepared to embrace his reductive theory of personal identity in all respects, but I'm deeply persuaded that whatever theory of personal identity we come to adopt, we'd do well to think much harder about the ways in which that identity over time can be said to be stable. ... DOWNLOAD PDF. Par t is a partisan of the psychological criterion of personal identity (Psych =). FUTURE PEOPLE Suppose we discover how we could live for a thousand years, but in a way that made us unable to have children. DEREK PARFIT PERSONAL IDENTITY AND RATIONALITY* There are two main views about the nature of personal identity. Par t: Identity Doesn’t Matter 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press. It means that she, one and the same person, is not now the same person. Parfit D (1986) Reasons and Persons. 2 Personal Identity through Time 92 Robert Nozick 3 Why Our Identity Is Not What Matters Derek Parfit 115 4 Survival and Identity David Lewis 144 5 Personal Identity and the Unity of Agency: A Kantian Response to Parfit 168 Christine M. Korsgaard 6 Fission and the Focus of One's Life Peter linger 184 7 Surviving Matters Ernest Sosa 199 This follows, he thinks, from the results of certain thought experiments—such as one put forth by David Wiggins—which seem to suggest that it is possible for A to survive into the future even if nobody will be identical to A at that time. I shall briefly describe these views, say without argument which I believe to be true, and then discuss the implications of this view for one of the main conceptions of rationality. Penfield W (1975) The Mystery of the Mind. IS PERSONAL IDENTITY WHAT MATTERS? 2. More exactly: Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Parfit D and Vesey G (1974) Brain Transplants and Personal Identity. Consider next a claim like, 'Since her accident, she is no longer the same person'. Derek Parfit 1 proposes that we separate the notions of identity and survival. Mostly an ethicist, but also dabbles in metaphysics. personal identity are considered by Derek Parfit in a paper entitled “Personal Identity.” Parfit’s own view is expressed in terms of a relationship he calls “psychological continuity.” He analyses this relationship partly in terms of what he calls “q memory” (“q” stands for “quasi”). Derek Par t: A British philosopher, recently deceased. This is a classical article in the 20th century analytical thought in philosophy. Derek Parfit ical, or one and the same ball. After we … If I paint one of these balls red, it will cease to be qualitatively identical with itself as it was; but it will still be one and the same ball. That involves both senses of identity. What matters in Personal Identity: A critique of David Lewis & Derek Parfit. The article exposes the quintessence of Parfit's position in one of the most crucial problems of metaphysics, namely, the problem of personal identity and challenges the common-sense view on this topic. Par t’s Thesis: Personal identity does not matter for sur-vival, memory, or moral responsibility. He … In Vesey G (ed) Philosophy in the Open. Open University Press, pp.